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Conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 
of the Bankruptcy Code: 
What Constitutes Property of the 
Post-Conversion Estate? 
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution 
grants Congress the authority to enact uniform laws of bank- 
ruptcy procedure.' While Congress has been fairly successful 
in enacting uniform bankruptcy laws, complete uniformity re- 
mains an elusive ideal mired in nebulous interpretations and 
conflicting adjudications.' In fact, bankruptcy legislation may 
be incapable of complete uniformity; few statutes, if any, are 
able to adequately resolve every contingent question that arises 
subsequent to their prom~lgation.~ Nonetheless, uniformity 
remains the standard, and nonuniform applications of the 
bankruptcy statute not only flout the constitutional mandate, 
they penalize some participants simply because of such fortu- 
itous circumstances as where the bankruptcy petition is filed. 
And when fortuity is replaced by forum shopping, the result is 
equally troubling: a less than uniformly applied bankruptcy 
statute should not reward creative debtors and their lawyers 
who strategically exploit its weaknessesO4 
This comment examines one particular weakness of the 
current bankruptcy statute that has engendered considerable 
1. U.S. CONST. art I, 8, cl. 4 ("[Congress shall have power to] establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States."). 
2. See, e.g., Arthur S. Hayes, Bankruptcy Judges Ponder Whether Heaven Can 
Wait, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1991, at  B1 (discussing widely inconsistent approaches 
to classifying religious donations under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
3. See Patrick Fitzgerald, Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) and 
Undersecured Creditors: What Date for Valuation?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 1979 
(1987). 
4. See In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991) (We are more im- 
pressed by the . . . observation that a rule of once in, always in is necessary to 
discourage strategic, opportunistic -behavior that hurts creditors . . . ."); Northwest 
Eng'g Co. v. United Steelworkers (In re Northwest Eng'g Co.), 863 F.2d 1313, 1318 
(7th Cir. 1988); In re Petrie, 142 B.R. 404, 405 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1992) (suggesting 
that forum shopping is inappropriate for Chapter 13 cases). 
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controversy. The nature of Chapter 13 estate property is gen- 
erally clear and uncontested. However, when a case is convert- 
ed from Chapter 13 to one under Chapter 7, the statute offers 
little guidance in determining the proper composition of the 
post-conversion estate. Some courts have found that the Chap- 
ter 13 estate survives conversion and constitutes the new 
Chapter 7 estate in its e n t i r e t ~ . ~  In contrast, other courts have 
concluded that only those property interests the debtor pos- 
sessed a t  the commencement of the original Chapter 13 bank- 
ruptcy qualify as part of the new Chapter 7 estate? In short, 
the proper composition of the post-conversion Chapter 7 estate 
presents "a legal question on which there is no harmony of 
opinion."? While most courts have held that after-acquired 
5. Calder v. Job (In re Calder), 973 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1992); In re 
Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136,' 138 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Marcus, 128 B.R. 294, 296 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1991), affd, 140 B.R. 803 (D. Colo. 1992); In re Schmeltz, 114 
B.R. 607, 610 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990); In re Daniels, 79 B.R. 88, 89 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1987); In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 715 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984); Winchester 
v. Watson (In re Winchester), 46 B.R. 492, 495 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984); see also 
Armstrong v. Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 1984); 
Resendez v. Lindquist (In re Lindquist), 691 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1982); In re 
Tworek, 107 B.R. 666 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Kao, 52 B.R. 452, 453-54 
(Bankr. D. Or. 1985); In re Tracy, 28 B.R. 189, 190 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983). 
6. In re Horton, 130 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); Tucker v. Hendren 
(In re Tucker), 133 B.R. 819, 821 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); In re Gorski, 85 B.R. 
155, 156-57 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Thrush v. Erchenbrecher (In re 
Erchenbrecher), 85 B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); McCullough v. Luna 
(In re Luna), 73 B.R. 999, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Arkison v. Swift (In re Swift), 81 
B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987); In re Marshall, 79 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 902 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986); In re 
Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14, 15-16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 640- 
41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Oliphant v. Amarillo Pantex Fed. Credit Union (In re 
Oliphant), 40 B.R. 577, 578 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 1984); cf. Bobroff v. Continental 
Bank (In re Bobroff), 766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985). 
7. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
1989), affd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991). 
There is a clear split of authority regarding this issue. 
An examination of developing case law in the area at issue reveals that 
two divergent lines of authority have developed. A majority of the cases 
considering the question of whether property of the estate in a case con- 
verted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 includes property acquired after the 
filing of the Chapter 13 . . . [pletition have held that the Chapter 7 es- 
tate does not include property acquired by the debtor subsequent to the 
filing of the original [pletition . . . . However, clearly a substantial num- 
ber of cases have rejected this same conclusion and thereby included this 
property in the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion. 
In re Leach, 101 B.R. 710, 713 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989); see also Blood v. 
Wineburg (In re Marshall), 79 B.R. 147, 149 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("This pro- 
ceeding concerns an issue which the Trustee acknowledges has resulted in a split 
POST-CONVERSION PROPERTY 
Chapter 13 estate property does not become part of the post- 
conversion Chapter 7 e ~ t a t e , ~  this comment argues that the 
post-conversion Chapter 7 estate should include the entire 
Chapter 13 estate. Part 11 introduces the Bankruptcy Code and 
relevant provisions of Chapter 13. Parts I11 and IV then pres- 
ent and analyze the nature of post-conversion Chapter 7 es- 
tates, finding that they are properly composed of the entire pre- 
conversion Chapter 13 estate. 
A. Development of the Current Statute 
Bankruptcy began as a collection device used to ensure 
equal division of a debtor's property among his ~redi tors .~ In- 
deed, some have written that in  Roman times "creditors did not 
merely divide the debtor's possessions, [they] took the debtor to 
the plaza and divided him.'"' 
In contrast to the harsh origins of creditor-favored "bank- 
ruptcy," a separate and subsequent development of bankruptcy 
law emerged that was favorable to debtors. This so-called insol- 
vency law, which was always voluntary," allowed debtors to 
place their property with the court in lieu of themselves being 
condemned to debtors' prison.12 While insolvency law provided 
a "discharge" from debtors' prison, it did not discharge debtors 
from their underlying financial obligations; creditors were still 
entitled to nonimprisonment collection remedies.13 
The tension between creditor-favored "bankruptcy" law and 
debtor-favored "insolvency" law existed in America throughout 
the nineteenth century. Congress was initially unable to recon- 
cile these two conflicting interests, and its attempts to enact 
uniform laws did not fare well.14 However, with the enact- 
of decisions across the country.");In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 640 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1984) ("The case law in this area is split but we will review it and attempt to 
reconcile it."). 
8. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 91 1307.01[8] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th 
ed. 1992). 
9. Teresa A. Sullivan et. al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An 
Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1098. 
10. ELIZABM'H WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 187 (2d ed. 1991). 
11. Sullivan et al., supra note 9, at 1098. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. ("Notwithstanding specific constitutional recognition that a uniform 
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ment of the seminal Bankruptcy Act of 1898,15 Congress suc- 
cessfully created a single, uniform debtor-creditor statute that 
sufficiently balanced debtors' interests in rehabilitation and a 
"fresh starty"%ith creditors' interests in full repayment of 
their claims. 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was subsequently amended by 
the Chandler Act of 193817 and ultimately repealed by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978." The Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 was enacted to facilitate better administration of bank- 
ruptcies caused by our modernizing consumer society.l9 As 
currently constituted, the Bankruptcy Code is organized into 
bankruptcy act was vital to national interests, more than a century passed before 
our legal ancestors could fashion a bankruptcy statute acceptable to competing 
constituencies.") (footnote omitted). The tension between "bankruptcy" and "insolven- 
cy" interests engendered remarkable acrimony. For example, in 1898 Nevada's 
Senator Stewart said that "[the proposed bankruptcy law] comes from the class of 
men who are grinding the face of the poor . . . [and from] the same spirit that 
hung and killed and drew and quartered women for witchery." Id. at 1099 (citing 
31 CONG. REC. S2362, S2408 (1898)). One scholar wrote the following about the 
development of early American bankruptcy law: 
Insolvency and bankruptcy were brought together in a series of short-lived 
acts. The Acts of 1800 and of 1841 were thought too generous. The for- 
mer was repealed within three years and the latter lasted only about a 
year. The 1867 Act was in some ways too strict and in others too liberal. 
I t  was extensively amended in 1874, only to be abandoned four years 
later. Essentially, then, the bankruptcy "system" for the first 109 years 
after the adoption of the Constitution was little more than a series of 
brief legislative fiats, alternately pro-creditor and pro-debtor, accompanied 
by a growing awareness that a uniform compromise law would better 
serve everyone. 
WARREN & WESTRROOK, supra note 10, at 188. 
15. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
11 U.S.C. $$ 101-1330 (1988)). 
16. S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5792-93. 
17. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
11 U.S.C. $8 101-1330 (1988)). 
18. 11 U.S.C. $5 101-1330 (1988) [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"]. 
The Code was signed into law on 6 November 1978 and became effective on 1 
Odober 1979. 
19. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code recites: 
The major purpose of this bill is the modernization of the bankruptcy 
laws. The substantive law of bankruptcy and the current bankruptcy 
system were designed in 1898, and underwent the last significant over- 
haul in 1938, nearly 40 years ago. Since that time there have been vast 
changes in the law of debtor-creditor relations, including the wide-spread 
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in the early 1960's and the 
vast spread of consumer credit. 
S. REP. NO. 989, supra note 16, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at  5788. 
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eight separate  chapter^.^' Chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain defini- 
tions and general rules of administration that apply equally to 
all four of the operative chapters.21 Chapter 7 prescribes an 
orderly procedure by which a bankruptcy trustee liquidates all 
nonexempt22 estate property and distributes the proceeds to 
creditors. Once the Chapter 7 process is completed, the debtor 
receives a discharge from most unpaid debts and is given a 
"fresh start."23 Chapter 9 allows certain municipalities to ad- 
just their debts, and Chapter 12 provides relief for family farm- 
ers with regular annual income." Chapter 11 is rehabilitative 
in nature25 and is designed for qualified busine~ses~~ that 
wish to continue operating while concurrently repaying credi- 
tors through a confirmed plan of reorganization. The last chap- 
ter of the Code, Chapter 13, is discussed in the next section. 
B. Chapter 13: Adjustments of Debts of an 
Individual with Regular Income 
1 .  History 
Although statutory relief for financially troubled wage 
earners has been available since 1867,~' Congress determined 
that the Bankruptcy Act's wage earners' plan was woefully 
inadequate and that far too many debtors were being forced 
into straight bankruptcy liq~idation.~' In response to this and 
20. Chapter 1-The General Provisions, 11 U.S.C. $8 101-109 (1988); Chapter 
3-Case Administration, $9 301-366; Chapter 5-Creditors, the Debtor, and Estate, 
$8 501-559; Chapter 7-Liquidation, $$ 701-766; Chapter 9-Adjustments of Debts 
of a Municipality, $$ 901-946; Chapter 11-Reorganization, $$ 1101-1174; Chapter 
12-Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income, 
$$ 1201-1231; and Chapter 13-Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular 
Income, $5 1301-1330. 
21. 11 U.S.C. $ 103(a) ("Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chap- 
ters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this 
title."). 
22. Debtors are entitled to exempt certain types and amounts of property from 
bankruptcy court control. See generally 11 U.S.C. $ 522. 
23. See S .  REP. NO. 989, supra note 16, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. a t  
5792-93. 
24. See generally 11 U.S.C. $$ 901-946, 1201-1231 (1988). 
25. Chapter 11 is composed of Chapters X, XI, and XI1 of the former Bankrupt- 
cy Act. Note that chapters under the Act were designated by Roman numerals, 
while chapters under the Code are designated by Arabic numerals. WARREN & 
WESTRROOK, supra note 10, a t  193. 
26. Chapter 11 is now available to qualified consumer debtors as well. See 
Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2202 (1991). 
27. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 394 (1966). 
28. Id. This, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, was undesirable. The Court 
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other concerns, Congress passed the Chandler Act of 1938, 
which significantly enhanced the protections accorded to wage 
earners who wished to restructure their debts and use future 
income to avoid ultimate liquidation. The following excerpt 
illustrates the purpose for Chapter XI11 of the 1898 Act, as 
amended by the Chandler Act of 1938: 
[Clhapter XI11 provides a highly desirable method for dealing 
with the financial difficulties of individuals. It creates an 
equitable and feasible way for the honest and conscientious 
debtor to pay off his debts rather than having them dis- 
charged in bankruptcy.2g 
Despite this optimism, the 1973 Commission on the Bank- 
ruptcy Laws of the United States3' determined that Chapter 
XI11 of the Bankruptcy Act was "seriously defective" and one of ' 
the "least understood and most erratically applied of all federal 
statutes dealing with [bankr-~ptcy]."~' Consequently, Chapter 
wrote, 'In [wage 
a mere fraction 
having been adju 
29. H.R. REP. 
earners'] proceedings, everyone [loses]-the creditors by receiving 
of their claims, the debtor by bearing thereafter the stigma of 
dged a bankrupt." Id. at  395. 
NO. 193, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959). The Senate concurred: 
We think there can be no doubt . . . that a procedure by which a 
debtor who is financially involved and unable to meet his debts as they 
mature, over a period of time, works out of his involvement and pays his 
debts in full is good for his creditors and good for him. 
S. REP. NO. 179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959). 
30. Congress appointed this commission in 1970 to 'study and recommend 
changes in bankruptcy laws." S. REP. NO. 989, supra note 16, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787. The Commission began its work in 1971 and filed its final 
report with Congress in 1973. Id. 
3 1. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at  5798-99. The legislative history 
indicates that Chapter XI11 of the Act was seriously defective in five respects: 
Id. 
First, it does not permit some individuals with regular income to qualify, 
such as small business owners or social welfare program recipients, be- 
cause their principal incomes do not come from wages, salary, or commis- 
sions. Second, while the court can grant a hardship discharge, where for 
example the debtor becomes totally disabled, three years must elapse 
first. Third, secured creditors are dealt with erratically, tediously, and 
uncertainly, resulting from a hodgepodge of state and federal statutory 
provisions, bankruptcy and local rules, many conflicting reported cases 
and varied local customs. Fourth, accommodation codebtors in consumer 
finance are usually inexperienced relatives or coworkers, and present law 
does not provide a reasonable restraint on collection from them while the 
debtor's case is pending. Fifth, formal creditor voting by literally counting 
written acceptances has u~ecessari ly imposed substantial expense for 
time, paper and uncertainty upon all concerned with only doubtful or 
marginal benefits. 
at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5799. 
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XI11 was repealed and replaced by Chapter 13 of the B a n h p t -  
cy Code. Chapter 13 provides regular wage earners a simple 
and effective alternative to Chapter 7 liquidation. It permits 
qualified debtors32 to keep their assets, restructure their debt, 
and repay their obligations under court supervision and pro- 
tection, over an extended period of time.33 Moreover, Chapter 
13 enables wage earners to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy and 
to enjoy "temporary freedom . . . from garnishments, attach- 
ments and other harassment by creditors.yy34 
2. Relevant provisions of the current statute 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is for those debtors 
who "are able to keep up with their obligations in normal 
times, but [who] do not prepare for emergencies or unexpected 
events such as a serious illness in a family or a job l a y - ~ f f . " ~ ~  
It  enables wage earners to keep their assets while pledging 
future earnings to satisfy current creditor demands.36 Section 
109(e) of the Code defines qualified wage earners as those who 
have "regular income"37 and whose total debt is within certain 
statutorily prescribed limits.38 
A Chapter 13 case is commenced by filing a voluntary 
32. Although Chapter 13 is statutorily limited to individual debtors, legislative 
history indicates that small sole proprietorships may also file for Chapter 13 pro- 
tection. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5968 (Chapter 13 . . . is limited exclusively to individuals, but 
permits small sole proprietorships to use the chapter."). 
33. See id. at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6079. 
34. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966). 
35. David S. Kennedy, Chapter 13 Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 MEM. ST. U. 
L. REV. 137, 138 (1989). 
36. 11 U.S.C. 1326(b)-(c) (1988). 
37. An individual with regular income is defined as an "individual whose in- 
come is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments 
under a plan under Chapter 13." 11 U.S.C. 101(29) (1988). Contrast this with 
the Bankruptcy Act's requirement that debtors' income be from wages, salary, or 
work "for hire." See Chandler Act, ch. 575, 606, 52 Stat. 840, 931 (1938) (re- 
pealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §$ 101-1330 (1978)). 
38. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988) reads: 
Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the 
filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less 
than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than 
$350,000, or an individual with regular income and such individual's 
spouse, except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the 
date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured 
debts that aggregate less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, 
secured debts of,less than $350,000 may be a debtor under Chapter 13 of 
[the Bankruptcy Code]. 
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bankruptcy petition under Chapter Within fifteen days 
after filing the petition, the debtor must propose a plan of re- 
payment4' detailing the amount of the debt to be repaid and 
the terms of repayment.41 After givbg adequate notice, the 
court conducts a hearing to determine whether the plan com- 
plies with the minimum statutory standards!' If it does, it is 
confirmed. A confirmed plan is usually completed in three 
years; nevertheless, it may be extended to five years upon court 
approval.43 When the plan is successfblly completed, the debt- 
or is deemed "rehabilitated" and is discharged from those debts 
that gave rise to the initial bankruptcy!4 
a.  Property of the estate. The composition of a Chapter 
13 estate is generally undisputed. Sections 541 and 1306 of the 
Code are applied conjunctively to define the estate property, 
which is created by operation of law at the time the bankruptcy 
39. 11 U.S.C. $ 301 (1988) reads: 
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing 
with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity 
that may be a debtor under such chapter. The commencement of a volun- 
tary case under a chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief un- 
der such chapter. 
40. 11 U.S.C. $ 1322 governs the contents of the plan. It requires that the 
debtor submit "all or such portion of the future earnings or other future income of 
the debtor" to the "supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the 
execution of the plan." 11 U.S.C. 5 1322(a)(l) (1988). 
41. BANKR. R. 3015(b): "The debtor may file a chapter 13 plan with the peti- 
tion. If a plan is not filed with the petition, it shall be filed within 15 days there- 
after, and such time shall not be further extended except for cause shown and on 
notice as the court may direct." 
42. 11 U.S.C. $9 1324-1325 (1988). Section 1324 states that "[alfter notice, the 
court shall hold a hearing on confirmation of the plan. A party in interest may 
object to confirmation of the plan." 
Section 1325 requires the court to c o n f i i  the plan if six elements are met: (1) 
the plan must comply with each of the other provisions of Chapter 13 and with 
other relevant provisions of the Code; (2) certain fees and charges must be paid 
before confirmation; (3) the plan must be "proposed in good faith and not by any 
means forbidden by law"; (4) it must be in the best interests of unsecured credi- 
tors-in other words, an unsecured creditor may not receive under the Chapter 13 
plan an amount of money which is less than the creditor would have received 
under a straight Chapter 7 liquidation; (5) secured creditors must have accepted 
the plan, or the debtor must either distribute under the plan an amount equal to 
the value of the secured claim as of the effective date of the plan or surrender the 
property securing the claim; and (6) the debtor must be able to make all payments 
called for by the plan and in all other ways fully comply with the plan. 
43. A plan may never exceed five years in duration. 11 U.S.C. $ 1322(c) (1988). 
44. 11 U.S.C. $ 1328(a) (1988). There are few debts that cannot be discharged 
by a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. $ 1328(aXl)-(3); infia note 127 and 
accompanying text. 
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petition is filed. Section 541, as the defining provision for each 
of the operative chapters, sets forth the broad rule that estate 
property consists of all legal and equitable interests the debtor 
has in property-both tangible and intangible-at the com- 
mencement of the case.45 However, this section generally ex- 
cludes from the estate acquisitions of post-petition property, 
including the debtor's earnings from "services performed . . . 
after the commencement of the case."46 Nonetheless, certain 
post-petition interests in property do become part of a 5 541- 
defined estate:? such as property acquired by the estate? 
45. See 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a) (1988): 
(a) The commencement of a case . . . creates an estate. Such estate is 
comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomev- 
er held: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, 
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case. 
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community 
property as of the commencement of the case that is- 
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of 
the debtor; or 
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for 
both an allowable claim against the debtor and an allowable 
claim against the debtor's spouse, to the extent that such 
interest is so liable. 
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 
329(b), 363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title. 
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered 
transferred to the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title. 
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the 
estate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the 
date of the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or 
becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date- 
(A) by bequest, device, or inheritance; 
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with 
debtor's spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; 
or 
(C) as beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death ben- 
efit plan. 
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property 
of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed 
by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case. 
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the com- 
mencement of the case. 
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that $ 541(a) should be broadly con- 
strued to include almost all pre-petition property. See United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 (1983). 
46. 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a)(6) (1988). 
47. For example, bequests, devices, inheritances, property settlements, and life 
insurance proceeds that are acquired within 180 days after the commencement of 
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In contrast to 8 541's generally rigid demarcation of pre- 
and post-petition property, 5 1306 of the Code makes the Chap- 
ter 13 estate elastic and continually expandable until the case 
is closed, dismissed, or converted. Section 1306 enlarges the 
Chapter 13 estate by declaring: 
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property 
specified in section 541 of this title- . 
(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that  
the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case 
but before the case is  closed, dismissed, or converted to a 
case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title whichever 
occurs first; and 
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after 
the commencement of the case but before the case is 
closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 
11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs firsta4' 
Thus, the statutory language makes i t  abundantly clear that 
before a case is converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the 
property of the Chapter 13 estate includes all 8 541 property 
acquired by the debtor, both pre- and post-petition. 
b. Conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. A Chapter 13 
case may be converted to a Chapter 7 case a t  any time.50 Ad- 
ditionally, the right of a voluntary conversion is nonwaivable; 
yet if appropriate, creditors may force conversion upon a recal- 
citrant debtor.51 Section 348 of the Code governs the effects of 
the case become part of a $ 541 defined estate. See 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a)(5)(A)-(C). 
48. See 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a)(7). 
49. 11 U.S.C. 8 1306(a) (1988). 
50. 11 U.S.C. $ 1307(a) (1988) ("The debtor may convert a case under this 
chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title at any time."). 
51. 11 U.S.C. $ 1307(c) sets forth those circumstances for which conversion 
would be appropriate: 
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, on request of a party 
in interest or the United States Trustee and after notice and a hearing, 
the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 
7 of this title, or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in 
the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause, including- 
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; 
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 
of title 28; 
(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title; 
(4) failure to commence making timely payments under section 1326 
of this title; 
(5) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of this title 
and denial of a request made for additional time for fding another 
11051 POST-CONVERSION PROPERTY 
conversion. Subsection (a) specifies that 
(a) Conversion of a case from a case under one chapter of this 
title to a case under another chapter of this title constitutes 
an order for relief under the chapter to which the case is con- 
verted [and] . . . does not effect a change in the date of the 
filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the 
order for relief.52 
Section 348(a) initially appears clear and unambiguous. 
Nonetheless, it has engendered considerable controversy, and 
in large part, its meaning controls the character of post-peti- 
tion, post-conversion property of a new Chapter 7 estate. 
A Chapter 13 estate includes post-petition acquisitions of 
propertys3 and will generally be broader than a Chapter 7 es- 
tate. When a Chapter 13 case is converted to  Chapter 7, howev- 
er, the Code is glaringly silent concerning the proper composi- 
tion of the post-conversion estate.54 Some courts have inter- 
preted the Code to mean that the entire Chapter 13 estate, 
including its post-petition property, survives conversion and be- 
comes part of the new Chapter 7 estate.s5 Conversely, a strict, 
mechanistic interpretation of the Code has led other courts to 
conclude that upon conversion, the old Chapter 13 estate is 
somehow constricted in scope and that the new Chapter 7 es- 
tate includes only that property in which the debtor had an in- 
plan or a modification of a plan; 
(6) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a con- 
firmed plan; 
(7) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of 
this title, and denial of confirmation of a modified plan under sec- 
tion 1329 of this title; 
(8) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a 
condition specified in the plan other than completion of payments 
under the plan; 
(9) only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the debt- 
or to file, within fifteen days, or such additional time as the court 
may allow, after the filing of the petition commencing such case, . 
the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521; or 
(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely 
file the information required by paragraph (2) of section 521. 
52. 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1988). 
53. See supra part II.B.2.a. 
54. In rn Lemon, 65 B.R. 130, 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). 
55. See supra note 5. 
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terest a t  the date of the original Chapter 13 filing.56 
A. The Language of the Statute 
Any inquiry into statutory construction must begin with 
the express language of the statute i t~elf .~ '  Following this 
mandate, a number of courts have focused on the strict lan- 
guage of the Code and concluded that the post-petition, pre- 
conversion Chapter 13 property is excluded from the new Chap- 
ter 7 estate. An analysis of the "structural" argument used by 
these courts reveals a recurring and deceptively simple struc- 
ture. 
Section 1306(a) states that 
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property 
specified in section 541 of this title- 
(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that 
the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case 
but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a 
case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title . . . .58 
Although 5 1306(a) enlarges and redefines property of the 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate, it becomes inapplicable when a 
case is converted to Chapter 7.59 Consequently, 5 541(a)~O be- 
comes the sole statutory provision used to define property of 
the post-conversion Chapter 7 estate? Because $541(aXl) 
56. See supra note 6. 
57. Craig W. Dallon, Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is a Consumer Debtor 
Eligible?, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1027, 1028. Mr. Dallon noted that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has written, " 'The starting point in every case involving construction of a 
statute is the language itself.' " Id. at 1028 n.6 (citing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 
259, 265 (1981) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))); see also Public Citizen v. United States Dep't 
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 469 (1989) ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., concurring) ("There is a ready 
starting point, which ought to serve also as a sufficient stopping point, for this 
kind of analysis: the plain language of the statute."). 
58. 11 U.S.C. $ 1306(a) (1988). 
59. Section 1306 is deemed inapplicable pursuant to the language of $ 10301): 
"Chapter 13 of this title applies only in a case under such chapter." 11 U.S.C. 
$ 103(h) (1988). In other words, the provisions of Chapter 13 do not apply when a 
case is converted from Chapter 13. 
60. See supra note 45 for the text of $ 541(a). 
61. The bankruptcy court in Blood v. Wineburg (In re Marshall), 79 B.R. 147 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987), looked at  the inapplicability of 8 1306 upon conversion and 
wrote, "The operation of Code $ 1306 re-defined the property as property of the 
bankruptcy estate during the course of the Debtor's Chapter 13 case. However, the 
continuing effect of Code $ 1306 ceased as  of the Debtor's voluntary conversion of 
the case . . . [as] the section applies only to Chapter 13 cases." Id. at  150; see also 
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~pec~ca l ly  limits the estate to  pre-petition property, the effects 
of conversion take on a heightened sigmficance. Section 348, 
which specifically governs the effects of conversion from one 
chapter to another, provides that conversion "does not effect a 
change in the date of the filing of the petition, the commence- 
ment of the case, or the order for relief."62 Therefore, ac- 
cording to the "structural" argument, the post-conversion Chap- 
ter 7 estate is defined as it would have been at  the original 
commencement of the case, and all property acquired after that 
date is excluded from the new estate.63 In essence, the result- 
ing Chapter 7 estate relates back to  the date the case was first 
commenced and is treated as if originally filed at that time. 
Thus, the converted case under Chapter 7 is viewed as never 
having been in Chapter 1 3 . ~  In the oft-cited In re Lenn~n,"~ 
Judge Cotton summarized the argument: 
[Ulpon the commencement of the Chapter 13 case, a Chapter 
13 estate is created that encompasses the Section 541 speci- 
fication of property of the estate as altered by Section 1306. 
The Section 1306 alteration, to  include the debtor's future 
earnings and property acquired after commencement of the 
case, is applicable only in the Chapter 13 context. When a 
case is converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the Chapter 
13 estate, any plan, and the case terminate. A new Chapter 7 
estate is created which relates back under Section 348(a) to 
the date of the commencement (filing) of the original Chapter 
In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) ("Due to $ 348(a), on con- 
version of a case from chapter 13 to chapter 7 the case is deemed commenced as 
of the date of the original petition as a chapter 7 proceeding and consequently, the 
chapter 13 estate, as defined by $ 1306, is deemed never to have existed."). 
62. 11 U.S.C. fj 348(a) (1988). 
63. Resendez v. Lindquist (In re Lindquist), 691 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1982); In re 
Gorski, 85 B.R. 155, 156 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (relying on relation-back analysis 
to determine that Chapter 7 estate is determined at  date of original petition); 
Arkinson v. Swift (In re Swift), 81 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987); 
McCullough v. Luna (In re Luna), 73 B.R. 999, 1004 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re 
Peters, 44 B.R. 68, 70 (Bankr. M.D. Tern. 1984); In re Bullock, 41 B.R. 637, 640- 
41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Lepper, 58 B.R. 896, 902 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986) 
(stating that $ 1306-defined property of the estate does not survive conversion). 
64. See Tucker v. Hendren (In re Tucker), 133 B.R. 819, 820 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
1991) ("[Ulpon conversion, a case should be treated as if it had been filed under 
the chapter to which it is converted."). Consequently, since the estate has been 
converted to Chapter 7, $ 1306 does not apply to, nor have any effect upon, the 
determination of what constitutes property of the estate. The estate, therefore, is 
determined only under 11 U.S.C. $ 541 as of the date of the original petition for 
bankruptcy. 
65. 65 B.R. 130 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 19%). 
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13 petition. Pursuant to Section 103(h) the provisions of 
Chapter 13 no longer apply. Therefore, property of this con- 
verted Chapter 7 estate must then be determined under Sec- 
tion 541 which is unaltered by Section 1306 or any other 
section of the Bankruptcy Code? 
Despite its persuasiveness, the foregoing statutory argu- 
ment is not definitive. An examination of 348 reveals nothing 
about the composition of a converted Chapter 7 estate? In 
fact, "[llike the pieces of a mosaic, [$ 3481 must be viewed along 
with the other statutory provisions of which it is intimately a 
part, in order to properly understand the entire creati~n.'"~ A
careful reading of 8 348 suggests that it was indeed intended as 
a source of continuity, and not a source of disruption. Accord- 
ingly, § 348 should leave matters as they existed on the date of 
conver~ion .~~ 
If § 348 is viewed as a source of continuity, "the plain lan- 
guage of 5 541 easily becomes susceptible to the conclusion that 
the bankruptcy estate, following conversion from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7, is the Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate."?' The estate, 
even when defined solely by 541, is not static; it is enlarged 
by certain post-petition acquisitions, including property the 
"estate acquires after the commencement of the case."71 In oth- 
er words, the estate consists of the debtor's pre-petition proper- 
ty as well as all post-petition property it acquires after the 
66. Id. at 135. 
67. One court has written: 
I t  is one thing to recognize that conversion does not affect the date upon 
which the case was commenced. I t  is quite another thing, however, to 
draw from this principle the doctrine that the case will be treated as 
though it had always proceeded under Chapter 7. Section 348(a) merely 
specifies that the date of the petition, commencement, and order for relief 
are unchanged. Its provisions do not mandate or necessarily imply "that 
upon conversion a c&e is to be treated in all respects as if it had origi- 
nally been filed under the chapter to which it has been converted." 
Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 612 (Bank.. N.D. Ind. 1989) (quot- 
ing Kepler v. Independence Bank of Madison (In re Ford), 61 B.R. 913, 916 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986)), a f d ,  951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991). 
68. Id. at 612-13. 
69. In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991) ("An equally good alterna- 
tive from a purely semantic perspective is that conversion from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7 does not affect the banhpt [cy]  estate but merely assures the continuity 
of the case for purposes of filing fees, preferences, statutes of limitations, and so 
forth."). 
70. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. a t  613. 
71. 11 U.S.C. $ 541(a)(7) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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commencement of the case. Therefore, when $8 541(a)(7) and 
1306 are read together, it is reasonable to conclude that all 
post-petition Chapter 13 property is acquired by the estate 
rather than by the debtor; as such, it would clearly be brought 
into the Chapter 7 estate pursuant to 8 541(a)(7).~' This plain 
and simple interpretation does not require a "strained or con- 
torted interpretation of the consequences of  onv version."^^ Un- 
fortunately, the direct statutory language is unclear, producing 
nothing more than a "semantic impasse"74 from which recon- 
ciliation between the competing interpretations is virtually 
impossible. 
B. Reasonable Inferences fron the 
Language of the Statute 
In certain circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court recogniz- 
es that courts may appropriately look beyond the precise lan- 
guage of the statute to ascertain legislative intent: 
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would 'com- 
pel an odd result,' we must search for other evidence of con- 
gressional intent to lend the term its proper scope. The cir- 
cumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,' for 
example, 'may persuade a court that Congress did not intend 
words of common meaning to have their literal effect. . . .' 
Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly prop- 
er when the result i t  apparently decrees is difficult to fathom 
or where it seems inconsistent with Congress' intenti~n. '~ 
Specifically in a bankruptcy context, "when the plain meaning 
[does] not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable 
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a 
whole' [the] Court has followed that purpose, rather than the 
literal  word^."'^ 
72. Calder v. Job (In re Calder), 973 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1992). 
73. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. at  613; see also In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 714 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (Q 348 does not purport to alter or modify the provisions 
or applicability of $8 541 and 1306). 
74. In re Lybrook, 951 F.2d 136, 137 (7th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Armstrong v. 
Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1984) (when viewed in its 
totality, the Code "create[s] a tension, if not a conflict" regarding the nature of the 
new post-conversion Chapter 7 estate). 
75. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989) 
(citations omitted). 
76. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting United 
States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)). 
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No provision in the Code unequivocally defines the charac- 
ter of a post-conversion Chapter 7 estate; nor does the legisla- 
tive history provide any real guidance.?' To resolve the issue, 
then, courts armed with the power of equitable fiat have looked 
to other provisions of the Code and attempted to divine its 
overall purpose.78 The following statutory provisions support 
certain inferences regarding the unrecorded legislative intent of 
Chapter 13 as it relates to this issue. 
Pursuant to 8 1325(a)(4), the Chapter 13 debtor's plan 
must be in the "best interests" of the Chapter 13  creditor^.'^ 
This requires that all creditors, whether secured or unsecured, 
receive at least as much as they would have if the debtor had 
originally filed a petition for Chapter 7 liquidation on the day 
the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed.80 Furthermore, if a 
debtor's financial condition improves during the repayment 
phase of Chapter 13, he may be required to amend his con- 
firmed plan in order to increase the amount of money received 
by his creditors.81 Thus, Chapter 13 creditors may reasonably 
77. See Ford Motor Co. v. Holly (In re Holly), 109 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ga. 1989) ("I do not believe Congress intended that monies paid to a Chapter 13 
Trustee pending confirmation which clearly is property of the Chapter 13 estate 
would be retroactively determined not to be property of the estate through a me- 
chanical application of 11 U.S.C. Section 541."); In re Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14, 15 
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1986) ("There is no obvious way to reconcile the conflicting statu- 
tory language" and the relevant "legislative history . . . is of Little help."). 
78. O'Quinn v. Brewer (In re O'QU~M), 143 B.R. 408, 413 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 
1992) ("[Tlhe Court must look to the overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, and 
attempt to balance the competing interests of the [dlebtors and the creditors of the 
estate."). 
79. 11 U.S.C. $ 1325(a)(4) (1988) (The court shall confirm the plan if "the val- 
ue, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the 
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that 
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under 
chapter 7 of this title on such date."). 
80. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at  322. 
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1329 reads: 
(a) At any time after c ~ ~ r m a t i o n  of the plan but before the completion 
of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of 
the . . . holder of an allowed unsecured claim, t+ 
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a par- 
ticular class provided for by the plan. 
Examples of changed circumstances include increased income, significant inheri- 
tances, and w i ~ i n g  a lottery. See Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240 
(4th Cir. 1989); In re Euerle, 70 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Koonce, 54 
B.R. 643 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985). 
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expect to receive a distribution based on "the debtor's circum- 
stances and the composition of the bankruptcy as they [existed 
on the date of conversion], and not as they once were when the 
petition was filed."82 Moreover, "[ilt makes little sense t o  rec- 
ognize this expectancy so long as the case remains in Chapter 
13 and then completely disregard it by excluding post-petition 
property from the bankruptcy estate upon conversion to Chap- 
ter 7."83 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 348(c) 
Section 348(c) authorizes the Chapter 7 trustee to assume 
or reject executory contracts and leases, including those that 
arose during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case.84 These 
powers are only exercisable by the Chapter 7 trustee if post- 
petition, pre-conversion contracts and leases survive the con- 
version and become part of the new Chapter 7 estate; other- 
wise, § 348(c) is rendered superfluous. One court wrote: 
Subsection (c) plainly authorizes the Chapter 7 trustee to 
assume or reject all pre-conversion executory contracts or 
unexpired leases of the Chapter 13 debtor, including those 
arising post-petition and even post-confirmation; an impossi- 
bility if those interests were not a part of the estate following 
confir rnat i~n.~~ 
3. 11 U.S.C. 348(d) 
Section 348(d) states that post-petition claims against the 
Chapter 13 estate shall be treated as if they had arisen imme- 
diately before the original petition date and are thus discharge- 
able in Chapter 13. It reads: 
A claim against the estate or the debtor that  arises after the 
82. See Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 613-14 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ind. 1989) (citing In re Arnold, 869 F.2d at 242-43) ("Congress . . . intended . . . 
that the debtor repay his creditors to the extent of his capability during the Chap- 
ter 13 period . . . . When a debtor's financial fortunes improve, the creditors 
should share some of the wealth."), affd, 135 B.R. 321 N.D. Ind. 1990), afd, 951 
F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991). 
83. Id. at  614. 
84. 11 U.S.C. $ 348(c) (1988) reads: "[Section 365(d), dealing with executory 
contracts and unexpired leases] of this title appl[ies] in a case that has been con- 
verted under section 706, 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title, as if the conversion 
order were the order for relief." 
85. In re Wanderlich, 36 B.R. 710, 714 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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order for relief but before conversion in a case that is convert- 
ed under section 1112, 1307, or 1208 of this title . . . shall be 
treated for all purposes as if such claim had arisen immedi- 
ately before the date of the filing of the petition.86 
According to at least one court, this "provide[s] debtors with an  
inducement to attempt to reorganize under Chapter 13 since 
post-petition claims could be discharged upon a failed reorgani- 
~ a t i o n . " ~ ~  By analogy then, it may be argued that the post-con- 
version Chapter 7 estate should be constituted in a manner 
that encourages debtors to first seek Chapter 13 rehabilitation 
and protection. Therefore, 8 348(d) is arguably an incentive for 
debtors to choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7. 
Yet given the Code as a whole, it seems incongruent that 
its drafters would have enacted this provision if they did not 
also intend that property acquired by the debtor during the 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy be available to pay those post-petition 
claims. Chapter 13 creditors are guaranteed to receive a t  least 
as much as they would have had their debtors chosen Chapter 
7 liquidation. If post-petition claims are satisfied by pre-peti- 
tion resources, the distribution to pre-petition creditors will 
likely be decreased; the size of the estate has remained the 
same but the number and amount of claims has quite possibly 
increased. I t  is only reasonable that debtors be required to 
place post-petition property in the Chapter 7 estate if they are 
going to be relieved from the liability of post-petition claims.88 
Because Chapter 13 creditors risk deterioration of their claims 
during bankruptcy, they "should also have the opportunity to 
share any benefits which might flow from an improvement'y89 
their debtor experiences during the case. 
4. Bankruptcy Rule 101 9(5) 
Bankruptcy Rule 1019(5) requires the Chapter 13 trustee 
to turn the entire Chapter 13 estate over to the Chapter 7 
86. 11 U.S.C. $ 348(d) (1988). 
87. In re Schmeltz, 114 B.R. 607, 609 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990). 
88. The Wanderlich court states that "subdivision (d) hardly would elect to 
treat post-petition creditors of the Chapter 13 debtor as being pre-petition claim- 
ants after conversion to Chapter 7, if post-petition cash deposits or property which 
the debtor acquired as a result of credit transactions were not to be included in 
the debtor's Chapter 7 estate." 36 B.R. at 714. 
89. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 615 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
1989). 
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trustee upon conversion. I t  reads: 
[When a chapter 13 case has been converted to a chapter 7 
case and] after qualification of, or assumption of duties by the 
chapter 7 trustee, any debtor in possession or trustee previ- 
ously acting in the . . . Chapter 13 case shall, forthwith, un- 
less otherwise ordered, turn over to the chapter 7 trustee all 
records and property of the estate in the possession or control 
of the debtor in possession or trustee.' 
While the Rule contains minimal substantive content, it quite 
possibly envisions a transfer of the entire Chapter 13 estate 
from the Chapter 13 trustee to the Chapter 7 trustee. There is 
no other administrative mechanism in the Code by which 
Chapter 13 property that is excluded from the new Chapter 7 
may be "returned" to the debtor. 
5. 11 U.S. C. $$361-362 . 
The filing of a Chapter 13 petition triggers an automatic 
stay against virtually all creditor collection and lien enforce- 
ment  attempt^.^' Because Chapter 13 debtors are entitled, at 
least initially, to keep their assets and satisfy their debts out of 
future income, the stay is extremely important for those debt- 
ors who are capable of confirming and completing a plan, but 
who are in jeopardy of losing their assets to secured creditors. 
The stay, however, is not absolute; secured creditors may ob- 
tain relief if they meet certain statutorily prescribed condi- 
ti on^.'^ In determining whether a particular secured creditor 
is entitled to relief from the stay, a court usually examines the 
debtor's equity in the property and the extent to which the 
property is needed for rehabilitati~n.'~ 
Additionally, two other issues are considered by courts in  
determining whether to grant a secured creditor relief from the 
stay.94 First, courts consider whether the debtor's proposed 
repayment plan "adequately protects" the secured creditor's 
~ o l l a t e r a l . ~ ~  Though "adequate protection" is acult to define 
90. BANKH. R. 1019(5) (emphasis added). 
91. See 11 U.S.C. $6 103(a), 362(a)(l)-(8) (1988). 
92. See generally 11 U.S.C. $ 362(d) (1988). 
93. 11 U.S.C. $ 362(d)(2) (1988). 
94. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 303. See generally 11 U.S.C. 
$ 362(d)(1) (1988), and BANKR. R. 4001(a)(l), which set forth the procedure for 
requesting relief from the stay. 
95. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 303. 
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pre~isely,'~ its general meaning is clear: a secured creditor's 
claim, as ascertained by the collateral's value at  the time the 
petition is first filed, may never be dimini~hed.'~ A Chapter 7 
liquidation provides a useful illustration. When a Chapter 7 
petition is filed, fully secured creditors are able t o  obtain relief 
from the stay by repossessing the collateral in satisfaction of 
the debts they are owed. In contrast, a Chapter 13 fully se- 
cured creditor is unable to seize its collateral in satisfaction of 
the debt it is owed; the creditor must simply stand by while the 
debtor continues to  use the collateral, which often results in 
damage, depreciation, or general collateral devaluation. Be- 
cause of these troubling possibilities, the Code requires Chap- 
ter 13 debtors to adequately protect the value of their secured 
creditors' ~ol la tera l .~~ 
Second, courts consider whether the debtor is able to fur- 
nish "adequate payment" to the creditors during the repayment 
period of the proposed plan." Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) of the 
Bankruptcy Code states that the debtor's proposed plan must 
provide for payment to  secured creditors (throughout the dura- 
tion of the repayment period) equal to the present value'00 of 
their claims as they existed at the time the plan was con- 
firmed, plus interest.''' Thus, while "adequate protection" is 
concerned with declining collateral values, "adequate payment" 
focuses on the amount a secured party should receive when its 
debtor is successful in making all payments called for by the 
plan.'02 In short, a court may lift the automatic stay and al- 
low secured creditors to  repossess their collateral if the court 
doubts the debtor's ability to fulf"ill either of these two require- 
ments. 
96. "Adequate protection is not defined in the Code." In re Alyucan Interstate 
Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). 
97. See generally 11 U.S.C. 8 361 (1988). 
98. This becomes important when the debtor defaults on the Chapter 13 plan 
and the secured creditor's only remedy is to then seize the collateral. Methods of 
adequately protecting collateral are found in 11 U.S.C. $ 361. 
99. WAF~REN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at  303. 
100. Simply explained, present value means that because a dollar can be used to 
create additional value, it is worth more today than it will be tomorrow. Present 
value is generally calculated by discounting the h ture  payment by the rate of 
return available to the investor over the specified period. 
101. 11 U.S.C. 8 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988) ("[The court shall confirm the plan if, 
with respect to each allowed secured claim] the value, as of the effective date of 
the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is 
not less than the allowed amount of such claim."). 
102. Id. 
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Chapter 7 debtors are required to relinquish ownership 
and control of their nonexempt property to the Chapter 7 trust- 
ee. In contrast, Chapter 13 debtors continue to own and control 
their property because they "adequately protect" the collateral 
by immediately making payments to the Chapter 13 trust- 
ee.lo3 In most Chapter 13 cases, post-petition payments to the 
Chapter 13 trustee represent the only "adequate protection" se- 
cured creditors receive from their debtors.lo4 As such, it  
seems patently unfair to stay the collection efforts of creditors, 
under the guise of adequately protecting their collateral's val- 
ue, while a t  the same time allowing debtors to use, deplete, or 
potentially damage the collateral. This is particularly applica- 
ble, for example, when the "adequate protection" given to credi- 
tors is returned to the debtors once the case is converted to 
Chapter 7. 
In In re Holly,1o5 the Chapter 13 trustee held post-peti- 
tion, pre-conversion payments made by the debtor pursuant to 
his plan of restructured payments. After considering whether 
the plan payments should be returned to the debtor, the court 
observed that "[elach secured creditor's interest in its collateral 
[was] impaired to the extent that i t .  . . received no payment 
and [was] prevented from foreclosing its security interest by 
the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)."lo6 It  follows, 
103. See 11 U.S.C. 5 1326(a) (1988). The debtor must file a plan of restructured 
debt payments within 15 days of filing the Chapter 13 petition. See BANKR. R. 
301503). Regardless of whether the plan has been confirmed, the debtor must begin 
making plan payments within 30 days after the petition has been filed. In the 
event that the plan is not confirmed, the Chapter 13 trustee is required to return 
the plan payments to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. $ 1326(a)(l)-(2) (1988). 
104. According to one court: 
In many and maybe most of the chapter 13 cases . . . cash payments 
through the trustee pursuant to the plan represent the only "adequate 
protection" provided for creditors with secured claims . . . . [Mlotions by 
secured claimants to lift the automatic stay of $ 362(a) for lack of ade- 
quate protection have been and will be denied in that the claimants have 
been provided adequate protection by way of cash payments through the 
trustee. 
. . . .  
Giving the undistributed funds, upon dismissal or conversion, to some- 
one other than the creditors provided for by the plan would be unfair to 
those creditors, and particularly to the secured creditors who have been 
promised these funds and who have relied on them for the protection 
afforded them under 5 361(1) of the Code. 
In re Rutenbeck, 78 B.R. 912, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987). 
105. 109 B.R. 524 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989). 
106. Id. at 525. 
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then, that when " 'adequate protection' proves to be inadequate, 
all affected secured creditors are entitled to alternative com- 
pensation . . . . They are entitled to a pro-rata satisfaction of 
those claims out of the monies which the Debtor has paid to 
the Tr~stee. '~'~' The court refused to believe that Congress in- 
tended Chapter 13 property to cease being estate property 
simply because of a "mechanical application of 11 U.S.C. 
$ 541."lo8 In sum, "adequate" protection and payment for 
Chapter 13 creditors depend, at least in part, on the nature 
and ever-increasing size of the post-petition estate. If post-con- 
version Chapter 7 estates are limited to pre-petition property, 
adequate protection and payment may be illusory concepts. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROVERSY 
The issue of whether post-petition, pre-conversion Chapter 
13 property becomes part of the new Chapter 7 estate appears 
convoluted, and the conflicting decisions seem irreconcilable. 
Nevertheless, it is imperative that the issue be resolved, if only 
to comply with the constitutional mandate for uniformity. The 
structural argument that 8 541 expressly limits the post-con- 
version Chapter 7 estate to pre-petition property is somewhat 
compelling. However, the structural argument fails to account 
for its result-that the Chapter 13 estate magically ceases to 
exist when a Chapter 13 case is converted to Chapter 7. In 
reality, the Code does not specify the composition of the post- 
conversion estate; in fact, if anything, the Code implies that the 
post-conversion Chapter 7 estate is not limited to pre-petition 
property. Recent decisions from the courts of appeals have 
corroborated this position, holding that post-conversion Chapter 
7 estates include all property of the pre-conversion Chapter 13 
estate. 
A. The Recent Cases 
Courts frequently rely upon In re ~ybrook'O~ for the prop- 
osition that the entire Chapter 13 estate sunrives conversion to 
107. Id. In re Barbee, 82 B.R. 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), came to the same 
conclusion. The court found that "[s]ection 1326(a) is clearly intended to provide a 
fund out of which the costs of a failed Chapter 13 case can be paid. It in effect 
shiRs the risk of failure from the trustee to the debtor." Id. at 473. 
108. In re Holly, 109 B.R. at 526. 
109. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), 
afd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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Chapter 7. In In re Lybrook, the debtors received an inheri- 
tance of more than $70,000 after they filed their petition for 
Chapter 13 relief, but before the case was converted t o  Chapter 
7."' While the inheritance was unquestionably part of the 
original Chapter 13 estate, there was some question as to  
whether it continued to  be part of the bankruptcy estate follow- 
ing conversion to  Chapter 7. After a detailed analysis of Code 
construction and policy, the bankruptcy court held that the 
inheritance was part of the new Chapter 7 estate."' 
On appeal, the debtors relinquished their statutory inter- 
pretation argument and attempted to shield the inheritance 
from their creditors on policy grounds. The debtors argued that 
Congress's desire to encourage the use of Chapter 13, in lieu of 
Chapter 7, would be "undermined" if their post-petition inheri- 
tance was not excluded from the new Chapter 7 estate.ll2 The 
debtors referred t o  the legislative history of Chapter 13, which 
indicates that Chapter 13 is designed as the ideal alternative to 
Chapter 7 liquidation. l3 Judge Posner, though, was uncon- 
vinced: 
[Ilt is not clear that the Lybrooks' position would on balance 
encourage rather than discourage this alternative. Their posi- 
tion makes an initial filing under Chapter 13 less risky, all 
right, but it also encourages conversions fiom Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7. In the end, as  many or more personal bankrupt- 
cies may end up in Chapter 7 as would be the case if property 
once it was included in the Chapter 13 estate remained in the 
bankrupt estate following conversion. 
We are more impressed . . . that a rule of once in, always 
in is necessary to discourage strategic, opportunistic behavior 
that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interest 
of debtors. A debtor who lacks confidence that he can actually 
work his way out of his financial hole by payments under a 
110. Id. The debtors received the inheritance more than 180 days after the origi- 
nal petition, thereby eliminating the possibility that it would have been part of an 
originally filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. .%e 11 U.S.C. 8 541(a)(5)(A) (1988). 
111. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. a t  615. 
112. 951 F.2d a t  136-37. 
113. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, a t  116, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6076-80; 
see also In re L e ~ o n ,  65 B.R. 130, 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) ("The statutory 
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code reflects a congressional intent to make attractive 
and encourage greater use, which must be voluntary, of Chapter 13 rehabilitation 
and creditor payment, rather than Chapter 7 liquidation with little or no creditor 
payment. When Congress enacted Chapter 13, it demonstrated its concern over the 
failure of old Chapter XI11 of the Bankruptcy Act to encourage consumer debtor 
use of the chapter for creditor payment as opposed to straight liquidation."). 
1128 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
Chapter 13 plan will nevertheless have an incentive to pro- 
ceed under that chapter as long as he can, holding his cred- 
itors a t  bay and thus staving off the evil day when they seize 
his assets. For he knows that if his position deteriorates fur- 
ther that it is the creditors who will bear the loss, while if he 
should get lucky and win a lottery or a legal judgment, or  
inherit money (after 180 days have passed since the filing of 
the petition), he will be able to keep his windfall by the sim- 
ple expedient of converting to Chapter 7.114 
The Tenth Circuit's subsequent decision in In re 
C ~ l d e r , " ~  which relies on In re Lybrook, provides further sup- 
port for this conclusion. Calder was an experienced bankruptcy 
attorney who originally filed a petition for relief under Chapter 
7 in 1986. His case was converted to  Chapter 13 in 1989, and 
then reconverted to Chapter 7 in 1990. Calder appealed the 
district court's decision to include approximately $60,000 of 
post-petition, pre-conversion wages in the reconverted Chapter 
7 estate. 
While conceding that the money was properly included in 
the Chapter 13 estate, Calder argued on appeal that the prop- 
erty of the new Chapter 7 estate should be determined as of 
the date of his original petition in bankruptcy.ll6 After re- 
viewing the interplay between @ 541, 1306, and 348, the Tenth 
Circuit held that "a proper reading of 5 348 indicates that it is 
not a source of disruption but, instead, preserves the continuity 
of the bankruptcy proceedings.""' The court based its deci- 
sion, at least in part, on the statutory language of $8 1306 and 
541(a)(7). Section 1306 makes it clear, reasoned the court, that 
after-acquired property and the debtor's post-petition earnings 
are included in the Chapter 13 estate. When the case is con- 
verted to  Chapter 7, § 541(a)(7) includes in the post-conversion 
estate "[alny interest in property that the estate acquires after 
the commencement of the case." Reading these two provisions 
together, the Court concluded that "all property in plaintiffs 
Chapter 13 estate-including any funds included pursuant t o  
$ 1306-are part of the postconversion Chapter 7 estate.""' 
114. 951 F.2d at 137-38. 
115. 973 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1992). 
116. Id. at 864. 
117. Id. at 866 (quoting Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 613 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), afd, 951 F.2d 136 
(7th Cir. 1991). 
118. Id. 
POST-CONVERSION PROPERTY 
In sum, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, relying respectively on 
policy grounds and statutory construction, determined that all 
Chapter 13 estate property should be included in post-conver- 
sion Chapter 7 estates. 
B. Further Policy Considerations 
Some courts have suggested that depriving debtors of their 
post-petition, pre-conversion property may discourage them 
from attempting Chapter 13  rehabilitation^."^ In  essence, 
these courts argue that it is incongruent to encourage the use 
of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 liquidation, yet penalize debtors 
who first attempted and failed a t  Chapter 13 rehabilitation. 
These courts argue that debtors are penalized when their post- 
petition property survives conversion and becomes part of the 
new Chapter 7 estate because that same property would have 
been excluded from bankruptcy court control had the debtors 
initially filed a petition under Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court 
in Hannan v. Kirshenbaum (In  re H ~ n n a n ) ' ~ ~  wrote the fol- 
lowing about the propensity conversion may have to penalize 
debtors: 
When a Chapter 13 plan does not work out, the debtor has 
the privilege of converting to Chapter 7, and when he exercis- 
es that right, no reason of policy suggests itself why the credi- 
tors [and the debtor] should not be put back in precisely the 
same position as they would been had the debtor never 
sought to repay his debts by filing under Chapter 13.121 
The foregoing argument fails to take into account the 
Code's numerous incentives to choose Chapter 13 over Chapter 
7. For example, Chapter 13 debtors are able to keep property 
that is encumbered by preexisting security interests, often by 
119. E.g., Haman v. Kirshenbaum (In re Hannan), 24 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1982); In re Shattuck, 62 B.R. 14, 15-16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) (deciding that it was 
within the public interest to encourage good faith Chapter 13 rehabilitations, and 
as such, "it would not be fair to penalize [the debtors] by disposing of monies 
which clearly would have been [excluded from the estate had it been originally 
filed under Chapter 71."); Tucker v. Hendren (In re Tucker), 133 B.R. 819, 821 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) ("Under $ 1326(a)(2) the Debtors could have obtained their 
plan payments at any time prior to conversion since no plan was confirmed. No 
statutory reason exists why the result should be any different when the demand 
for return of the plan payments is made after conversion to Chapter 7."). 
120. 24 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
121. Id. at 692. 
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making lower monthly payments to their creditors.'" It sim- 
ply does not follow that prospective Chapter 13 debtors, if given 
the choice of losing their assets immediately or possibly losing 
them later, would choose to lose them immediately by filing 
under Chapter 7. 
Furthermore, debtors who own their own homes have an 
incentive to file under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7.123 
Under Chapter 13, courts have traditionally allowed debtors to 
satisfy arrears within a reasonable time and lower their mort- 
gage balance through a controversial technique called "lien 
stripping."'" On the other hand, Chapter 7 debtors with eq- 
u i t ~ ' ~ ~  in their homes are statutorily required to use that eq- 
uity to satisfy their debts, often culminating in the loss of their 
home. But possibly most important of all, Congress provided a 
much broader discharge from debts in cases under Chapter 13 
than i t  did in cases under Chapter 7. Of the 12 
nondischargeable debts of Chapter 7,126 only three are 
nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.12' Therefore, while 
debtors may risk losing some after-acquired property, this risk 
alone will not dissuade them from filing under Chapter 13. 
Rather, it is far more likely that debtors will choose Chap- 
ter 13 over Chapter 7 because of the foregoing statutory incen- 
tives and because i t  allows them to keep property they would 
otherwise have to relinquish to the Chapter 7 trustee. Finally, 
if debtors are entitled to limit their converted estates to pre- 
petition property, they may be encouraged to first fde a Chap- 
ter 13 petition, and if convenient, later convert to Chapter 7. 
This incentive to convert from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is irrec- 
oncilable with Congress's desire that debtors perform Chapter 
13 rehabilitation. 
122. See 11 U.S.C. 8 1322(b)(2) (1988). 
123. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 367. Approximately 52% of all 
debtors own their own homes. Id. 
124. Id. 11 U.S.C. 5 1322(b)(2) allows Chapter 13 debtors to reduce their 
oversecured debts to an amount commensurate with their collateral's value. In a 
move "fraught with controversy," some courts have allowed debtors to reduce their 
home mortgages in much the same way. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at  
3 18. 
125. Debtors are entitled to exempt the first $7,500 of equity pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 522(d)(l) (1988). 
126. See 11 U.S.C. 8 523(a)(l)-(12) (1988). 
127. See 11 U.S.C. 8 1328(a) (1988). Nondischargeable debts in a Chapter 13 
proceeding include some types of student loans, debts for alimony or support, and 
debts incurred while driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328(a)(2) (1988). 
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Excluding post-petition property from the post-conversion 
Chapter 7 estate would "build a strange anomaly into the 
Bankruptcy Code."128 Debtors would be able to use Chapter 
13 for their own convenience, yet convert to Chapter 7 when 
Chapter 13 becomes unattractive. Two examples are illustra- 
tive. First, if a debtor's financial condition improves and the 
court orders a plan modification for the benefit of the debtor's 
creditors, the debtor may simply convert to Chapter 7 and 
retain the new property that motivated the court to order the 
modifi~ation.'~~ Court orders are not issued merely to be 
flouted a t  the debtor's discretion. 
Second, consider the hypothetical Chapter 13 debtor who 
wins one million dollars in  the state lottery. As a result of his 
new wealth, the debtor incurs substantial post-petition debt 
and the bankruptcy court orders him to modify his Chapter 13 
repayment plan for the benefit of his creditors. Not only can 
the debtor discharge his post-petition debts pursuant to 
# 348(d), he may also convert his case to Chapter 7 and exclude 
his lottery winnings from the new Chapter 7 estate. This result 
is entirely indefensible. 
Similarly, the scope of the debtor's discharge is the same 
whether the case is converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed and 
immediately followed by a subsequent Chapter 7 petition; in 
either case, claims are equally dischargeable regardless of 
when they arose.130 Congress specifically intended this to be 
the case.13' When the case is dismissed and a new petition is 
filed, the debtor's post-petition Chapter 13 property is unques- 
tionably part of the new Chapter 7 estate. Otherwise, Chapter 
13 debtors would have an  incentive to convert their cases to 
Chapter 7, rather than having them dismissed. They could 
exclude post-petition property upon conversion, but be forced to 
include it in a newly refiled Chapter 7 case. The Seventh Cir- 
cuit, in In  re Northwest Engineering Co.,lS2 ruled that the 
Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted in a way that avoids 
the creation of strategic incentives. Consequently, debtors 
128. Robb v. Lybrook (In re Lybrook), 107 B.R. 611, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
1989), affd, 135 B.R. 321 (N.D. Ind. 1990), afd, 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991). 
129. Id. The right to a voluntary conversion is absolute. 11 U.S.C. 5 1307(a) 
(1988). 
130. In re Lybrook, 107 B.R. at 614. 
131. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. HI1098 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of 
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 9 Bkr-L Ed 5 81:3, at 37 (1979)). 
132. 863 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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should not be encouraged to choose conversion over dismissal. 
Even though the choice between conversion and dismissal 
will have no impact on the debtor's discharge, it has a tremen- 
dous impact on creditors. When the post-conversion estate is 
limited to pre-petition property, the amount of property avail- 
able to satisfy claims may be substantially less. Debtors and 
creditors should enjoy the same results whether the case is 
converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 or is dismissed from 
Chapter 13 and followed by a separate petition under Chapter 
7. The discharge is the same; the price of that discharge should 
also be the same. 
If a debtor fails to meet the standards of Chapter 13, the 
court may dismiss or convert his case, "whichever is in the best 
interests of creditors and the estate."133 This implies that 
there will be a difference between dismissal and conversion, 
and that one of the two will better serve the estate and its 
creditors. I t  is obviously in the best interests of creditors to 
define Chapter 7 estate property as of the conversion date. 
Likewise, it is obviously in the best interests of the estate to be 
converted instead of hsmissed because only by conversion are 
post-petition claims discharged pursuant to 5 348(d). When 
post-petition property is nonexistent or insignificant, it may be 
best to grant a dismissal. 
Finally, the structural argument fails to consider the dual 
debtor-creditor nature of the Code. In most cases, there is no 
question that debtors are better off when their post-conversion 
estates are limited to pre-petition property. They keep and use 
pre-petition property while shielding post-petition property 
from creditor control. And, in the event their Chapter 13 case 
fails, they are treated as having initially filed a liquidation 
petition. Creditors, meanwhile, are forced to bear the costs of 
successful and unsuccessful Chapter 13 proceedings. 
Federal law should treat similarly situated persons fairly; 
despite its merits, the Bankruptcy Code fails in this regard. 
The Code is susceptible to disparate applications, and as a 
result, similarly situated debtors whose cases are converted 
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 have been treated hssimilarly. 
The principle consideration behind the bankruptcy statute is 
133. 11 U.S.C. 9 1307(c) (1988). 
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one of balance: debtors need time to fulfill their obligations or, - 
in the alternative, to receive a fresh start; creditors reasonably 
expect to collect from their debtors, and if appropriate, to re- 
ceive an increase in their financial return as their debtors' 
situations improve. 
Congress enacted a statute that needs further refinement. 
The conclusion that the entire Chapter 13 estate survives con- 
version and becomes the Chapter 7 estate is consonant with 
other Code provisions and well within the policy considerations 
underlying bankruptcy legislation. After reviewing the Code's 
ambiguities and the equitable principles involved, thoughtful 
courts should follow the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and hold 
that post-conversion Chapter 7 estates are properly composed 
of the entire pre-conversion Chapter 13 estate. 
David A. Hardy 
